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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In Re:

ROBERT B. HANSEN
No. 15605

Disciplinary Proceeding
APPELLANT'S REF

met by oral argument.

Y

BlUJ':I"

There are several points, however,

where we deem it desirable to reply.
POINT I.

THE UTAH STATE BAR COMMISSION
COULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The Bar Commission asserts at various places in its
brief (see, for example, P.2)

that the Bar Commission did

consider the mitigating circumstances in arriving at its
recommendation for a one-year sucope?.nsion.

Otherwise, it

argues, the recommended penalty would have been more severe.
We pointed out in our initial brief that the findings are
conclusionary in nature, and do not even purport to address
the evidentiary matters relating to mitigation.

We further

noted that the evidence was not transcribed until after the
Bar Commission had entered its order.
January 6, 1978.
1978.

The evidence

WdS

The order is dated

transcribed January 18,

The hearing examiners, of course, heard the evidence,

but the Bar Commission did not.

We respectfully submit that

the Court should not give substant iaJ 1·1cight to the Bar
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Commission's recommendation, because the circumstances regarding mitigation were never heard by or apparent from the record
before the Bar Commission.

The answering Brief does not make

any attempt to answer these assertions.

It merely

£~asons

that the Bar Commission must somehow have known the circumstances, because otherwise it would have recommended a more
severe penalty.
PIELLJ\NT I :c: _OMl'J,/'.IN 1';; '\J;()lJ'f' 'l'JiJ:
FINDINGS ON THE DICK MATTER ARE FULLY
JUSTIFIED, EVEN THOUGH HE PREVAILED
ON THAT ISSUE.

i

Appellant has been tried and convicted in the press.
The charges made against him in the complaint in the Dick
matter were serious, but the evidence did not sustain the
allegations of wrongdoing.

The hearing examiners' negative

findings in the Dick matter simply are not supported by the
evidence.

We have argued this in detail in our initial brief,

and we won't reargue it here, but, for example, par. 7\b)
is a finding that "Respondent [Appellant] apparently did not
ascertain the identity of the fee title holder,"
prepared the contract of sale.

when he

This simply is not true.

Appellant testified (R. 434) that he had a title report and
he knew that Soelberg was the owner of the property.
nowhere contradicted.

This is

The c . mtract itself, whe:rrein the Dicks

were the named purchasers, and American National Mortgage Co.
was the seller, was introduced in evidence as Ex. 49.

Par. 6
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of that contract expressly states that it is understood,
"there there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of LeRoy Soelberg, Sr. and Jean E. Soelberg,
with an unpaid balance of $3 ,600 as of May 18, 1965,"
49).

(Ex.
th~

Further, John R. Dick testified that Appellant told

that Soelbergs had an interest !Depos. p.10).

He was a.sked

if he knew Soelberg was the seller, and he t:estified,

"J

interest," and he explained that Appellant had so advised
them (Depos. p.10).
Thus, the charges in the complaint and Finding 7(b) not
only are not sustained by the evidence, but they are contrary to the only evidence.

Finding 7 (b) is a negative findin

The hearing examiners and the Bar Commission, in approving
the hearing examiners' report, ccncludc by 7(b)

Lhat he was

guilty of misconduct, but it was not bad enough to violate tlie
Code of Professional Conduct.
finding is not true.

As a matter of fact, the

It is not .supper tcd by any evidence,

and the Appellant was fully justified in challenging, in

hi~

initial brief, this and other similar negative findings on
Dick matter.

t~

They stand as an undeserved blemish on his

record.
The rest of our argument in the Dick matter is adequate1 1
made in the opening brief, and we won't repeat it, but the
Bar Commission is not entitled to enter findings which
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cast the Appellant in an unfavorable light, and then assert
in its brief here that Appellant should not be heard to
complain.
POINT III.

THE BAR COMMISSION'S ORDER IS
NOT ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION
OF CORRECTNESS.

On p.8 of the answering Brief, the Bar Commission
asserts that the Appellant "may

no~

simply urge his version

of the facts upon this court when the Commission has rejected
that version ... "

Appellant's complaint here is that the

hearing examiners did not address the evidentiary disputes
in their findings.

They simply entered conclusionary findings

and no one can tell what particular facts were accepted to
arrive at the conclusion.

For example, on the Lowry

matter, there really isn't any doubt that the assertion
being made by the Bar Commission was that as the money was beinq
received from Boothe and Gardner, it was being commingled
and not maintained in a trust account.

As we indjcated in

our initial brief, there is no evidence of such commingling
on the Lowry account.

This assertion is not challenged by

the Bar Commission in its answering Brief, but it says that
after a number of years, Appellant closed out his trust
account and took the remaining money, and this, they say in
their answering Brief, is the commingling complained of.
It is not the commingling they charged.

It is not the
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It would not appear to

corruningling they tried to prove.

be the corruningling which the hearing examiners refer to in
par. 4(g) of their findings.

The hearing examiners

conclud~

that Appellant "failed to maintain the funds collected in a
separate trust account, and corruningled the same with his own
funds."

In Count I, par. 2 of the complaint, the charge is

As we pointed out in our initial brief, there is no
showing that he did not "maintain" the Lowry funds in his
trust account.

There is no showing that he "commingled"

the Lowry funds with his other funds.

He had a separate trus:

account, and as far as this record shows, all of the Lowry
funds went into it.

Several ·•ears aft er he had closed

his private practice and his ':rust acconnt had become inactive
he closed out his trust account, but that does not fit ejthrr
the charge in the complaint nor the language of the finding,
and the failure of the hearin'] eoxaminers Lo address the-' [,J'<'c'
evidentiary disputes makes it impossible for us to know what
they in fact intended to find.

Failure to maintain a trust

account, and the commingling of client's funds is one thing.
Closing out a dormant trust account lung after he had gone
out of the private practice is another.
One other example will demonstrate this fully.

It

is

argued by the Bar Commission on page lJ tha1- in the Piepenburg matter,

~-he

statement L··

che

1pp1 Ua"l

-1~

I

expected the jury to vote was made as a part of the
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interview which took place at the counsel table, with the
reporter taking notes.

Appellant testified that he did not make

that statement as a part of that interview (R.374).

He had

an interview with Mr. Horton at counsel table, which Appellant
expected to be published.

(R.370).

He was asked some further

questions on an informal basis as he left the courthouse to
go out onto the street.

(R. 374).

Horton said these state,;,):_ ,_cd at counsc

table in the courtroom,
left the building.

I

(R.133), or may have occured as they

{R.149).

The hearing examiners did not

address this conflict in the testimony at all, and yet the
Bar Commission

argu~s

on p.9 of its brief that all of the

statements concerning how the jury would vote took place as a
part of the interview at counsel table.
did not so find.

In arguing the case

'rJ,c; hea:ring examiners

Lu Li, .Ls

court, the Bar

Commission is not entitled to represent that the hearing
examiners considered that dispute in the evidence, and resolved
it in favor of the Bar.

We cannot tell, and neither can anyone

else, whether the hearing examiners believed Appellant that
this conversation about how the jury would vote took place
as they left the courthouse building, and still concluded
that this violated the canons.

If it took place at counsel

table with the reporter taking notes,

~n a formal

interview

which the Appellant admitted he intended to be published, the
conclusion that he should have expected it to be published is
fully supµorted.

If it took place in an intormal atmosphere,
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-7as they walked out of the building to go to lunch, it present
the matter in an entirely different light.
iners ignored this
ing it.

co~flict,

The hearing exam-

and made no finding at all

The Bar Commission argues

rega~

(p.10) that it wouldn't

make any difference if the interview took place on the way
out of the building, and it wouldn't make any difference if
the reporter kned of th<e

)udcw's c "'ccrn dbout

1-J1r~

·ju:ry.

We

think it does make a difference, and that the hearing examiner
should have addressed these evidentiary conflicts.

Since

they did not do so, we think we are fully warranted in asking
the court to examine the evidence.

We emphasize that the Bar

Commission could not have done so, because the findings made
did not address the problem, and the transcript of the evident
was not available.
POINT IV.

THERE WAS A FAILURE TO ACCOUN'I' TO
LOWRY AND EMARINE, BUT THE CIR·CUMSTANCES ARE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT.

The findings on the failure Lo account are

sirr~ly

"bare-bones" conclusions, that there was such a failure.
This is all that the Bar Commission could have known,
because the findings contain nothing else, and the evidence
was not transcribed.

Further, the oral arguments were not

even taken down by the reporter.

So the Bar Commission had

nothing to guide it but the conclusion that there had been a
failure to account - but none of the circumc;tance:c; or
particulars before it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

The uncontraverted evidence shows that for a long
period of time Mr. Hansen had made collections, deposited the
money to his trust account, advised the client that the
money had been received, and after the check had cleared,
promptly made the disbursement.

Then he closed down his

private practice, discharged his regular help, and moved his
records, books, etc., into his home.

His family assisted

him in keeping the records and making lhc deposits, and his
longtime secretary came in for a period of time, for about
one day a week.

(See p. 26 of our initial brief.)

During

this period of time, there were a half dozen instances where
the Emarine money was deposited in his law account, rather
than in his trust account, but disbursement was immediately
made, and this inadvertent commingling caused no harm (see
our initial brief p.29).
Admittedly, some collections were made after he closed
his office, and his system for accounting and disbursement
did not function properly.

There is absolutely no evidence

of an intention on his part to keep the funds or conceal from
his client that he had made the collection.

In fact, the

failure to disburse came to light when the Appellant, on his
own volition, sent an affidavit to Mrs. Emarine showing the
monies collected and the monies still due from her ex-husband.
She realized that some of the money collected had not been
remitted to her and she so advised the Appellant.

Appellant

could not find his file, and asked her for help to straighten
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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out the account.

In this context, the Appellant admits that

he had not accounted, and that he could not account, because
he could not find his files.
This is a circumstance that the Bar Commission could nol
have known from the findings, because the findings don't
reflect it.

It is a circumstance that the Bar Commission

could not ha're considered
c.ranscribed

uria .vas

because t-.he ev.i.dence had not

not oefore it..

l'his .is :oJJOtlignt.cd on

pages 16 and 17 of the Bar Commission's brief.
conclusionary findings are noted.

bE~r'n

On page 16 thr

On page 17 it is stated

that "it is apparent that the Bar Commission took into account
matters of "so-called mitigation."

The

bric~f

then reasons,

otherwise the penalty would have been more severe.

Surely,

the findings do not reflect the circumstances, and surely tl!e
Bar Commission did not have the transcript.
ting circumstances.
function~d

well.

r1•hese were mitiqc·

The Appellant did have a system which had

The commingling of several payments was

inadvertent and caused no harm.

He otherwise held the

Emarine and Lowry monies separate 1 'om his own funds unti]
he closed his dormant trust account.
notified them of the collections.

In the early years he

He paid them promptly until

he closed his office and it was thereafter that the system
failed to function properly.

He then brought Mrs. Emarinc's

attention to monies 1vhich had bec.·n collect Gd, when he sent
her an affidavit for her signature--the aff.in0•.rit
the monies collected.

rpfJcr1r'r1

She knew she had not rGceivcd all ol
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-10them, and asked for an accounting, but he could not thereafter find his files.

The fact that he closed his office

and separated himself from his longtime help, did not
relieve him of the legal duty to account for and pay over the
money to his clients, but it is crystal clear that he was not
intentionally failing to account or failing to pay.

When the

problem surfaced, he was in the middle of an election campaisr1.

coming to him through the press.

His files were in numerous

cardboard boxes, and the Emarine file could not be located.
As soon as he was able to identify the money that he owed,
he paid it, and on the initial demand, he deposited the full
amount then demanded with the court.
We simply are asking the court to consider these circurnstances and are pointing out to the court that the Bar
Conunission didn't and couldn't have done so, because

the

findings do not reflect them at all, and the transcript and
arguments were not available.
POIHT V.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS MORE
THAN A TECHNICAL DEFENSE.

The argument at page 18 that the duty to account continued up to the filing of the complaint with the Bar is
without merit.

The statute of limitations commences

to run when the duty matures.

On a common debt, the duty to

pay continues up until the time the debt is paid or discharged,
liut the c;tcitutc starts to run

1.'hr>n

the duty to pay matures

The duty to account and to pay
and becomes
in
default.
Sponsored by
the S.J.
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three years before the filing of the complaint with the Bar.
As noted on page 20 of the Bar Commission's brief, Mrs. Lowr\
made a request for an accounting on May G, 1968.
account matured at least by that time.

The duty tG

Part of the problem

the Lowry case was the inability of the Appellant to find
his files and records, and part of that problem is the result
of the lapse of time--the
.s Ld

~

u tt_

·~·

f

I_ l

~ery

reason for the imposition of

~

rr. it·.-;_

The technical defense as to Mrs. Lowry being a client
is again a matter of substance.

The client in the lawsuit

was Franklin Life Insurance Co.,

(See Exs. 8 and 9).

Mr.

Lowry was the agent, and Appellant dealt directly with Mr.
Lowry and remitted the money to him.
his wife became his executor, and
lant dealt with her.

Ln

When Mr. Lowry died,
thi1t capacity the Appe]

However, he .11as never

in her individual capacity as a client.

:cepref~ented

hr:J

Mrs. Lowry recogni;-.c

Franklin Life as the client and wrote she would have to ask
the company to change attorneys.

(Ex. 3) .

She admits that f;J1e

never met Mr. Hansen, never talked to him in per son or by

p) 11 •

and never received a letter from him (H. 20), and we do not believe that the Bar established an attorney-client relationsh0
with her as an individual.

She did not file a complaint on

behalf of Franklin Life nor as executor of the estate of Mr
Lowry, and the complaint filed was long after the statute
of limitations had run.

As noted on p.22 of the Bar's brief,

the "eleven year old file" show0·1! nu acLion.
not
punish
Appellant
because
he bycould
not
Sponsored
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-12find all of his records nor reconstruct an eleven year old
file.
Dated this 30th day of June, 1978.

~

Edward W. Clyde

(AJ, 1, !

'V{?}-:1;?-,;,0-c'>-

W.L ll i an1 G.

-Gibbs--

----

Attorneys for Appellant
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